Maryland Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1

Article 11

Recent Decisions

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Recommended Citation
Recent Decisions, 17 Md. L. Rev. 84 (1957)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol17/iss1/11

This End Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Recent Decisions
Damages - Wife Entitled To Recover For Loss Of
Consortium Of Husband Injured Through Defendant's
Negligence. Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N. W. 2d 480 (Iowa, 1956).
Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging that due to defendant's
negligent operation of an automobile her husband was
permanently injured and that she had thereby been deprived " 'of the aid, services, support, affection, society,
companionship, and consortium, including sexual relations
of her said husband'." The trial court sustained a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a
cause of action. On appeal, held, reversed. Since the law
recognizes the husband's right of consortium and since a
married woman is no longer under the common law restrictions of coverture but stands as an equal of her husband
in the eyes of the law, she also is entitled to recover for
loss of consortium. The principal precedent cited was
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811, 23 A. L. R. 2d 1366
(C. A. D. C. 1950), cert. den. 340 U. S. 852 (1950), the logic
and reasoning of which the court felt was sound "in the
light of present day standards and ideals".
Maryland first passed upon this question in Emerson v.
Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538, 5 A. L. R. 1045 (1918), in
which much the same arguments were made to the Court
of Appeals as were made in the Acuff case. In refusing to
allow recovery, the Court distinguished between intentional torts, such as alienation of affection, Wolf v. Frank,
92 Md. 138, 48 A. 132 (1900) [an action since abolished by
statute, Md. Code (1951), Art. 75C, Sec. 2] and acts of
negligence. The Court also rejected the attempt to draw a
parallel to the husband's right to recover for loss of consortium, relying simply on its construction of the reported
cases and CooLEY [COOLEY, TORTS (3rd Ed.) 474]. The question was again presented to the Court of Appeals in Coastal
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A. 2d 82 (1955),
five years subsequent to the decision of the Hitaffer case.
After defining consortium as including "'society, affection,
assistance, and conjugal fellowship'," the court stated at
pages 46 and 47, "It has been held in a number of jurisdictions that a husband may recover for loss of consortium in
a negligence action, and while not expressly adjudicated
in Maryland, this has been the accepted practice." In re-
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fusing to extend such a right to the wife, the Court pointed
out that the Hitaffer case had not at that time been followed
by any court of last resort, and, though acknowledging it
to be a questionable decision, refused to overrule the
Emerson case. Perhaps the most cogent reason advanced
by the Court for denying recovery in these cases was that
"the duty owed by a negligent defendant does not extend
to remote consequences, affecting third persons," (49), but
this should also apply to the husband's right of recovery
which, in the dictum quoted above, the Court had just
recognized. To bolster the decision it was noted that the
right of consortium of the husband is probably a vestigial
remnant of his right of servitium and, being somewhat an
anachronism, should not be extended. The cases are collected in the annotation to the Hitaffer case in 23 A. L. R.
2d 1378.
Due Process - Notice To Known Incompetent Without
Protection Of Guardian Does Not Satisfy Due Process.
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956). By Article
VII A, Title 3, New York Tax Law (McK. Consol. Laws,
Ch. 60; 10 C. L. S., Sec. 165-b) notice of tax lien foreclosures
is given by publication, posting, and mailing, and the
statute purports to apply to all defendants including infants
and incompetents. Judgment foreclosing a tax lien was
entered under this procedure against the property of one
Brainard whom the town authorities knew to be an incompetent. Five days after the execution of a deed under this
judgment conveying title to the town, Brainard was certified by the county court as a person of unsound mind.
Appellant was appointed as committee of her person and
property and moved to set aside the deed. Appellant contended that the taking of property under these circumstances was a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and on appeal from an adverse decision of
the New York Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme
Court reversed. It is a fundamental requirement of due
process that the notice of the proceeding be reasonably
calculated under all circumstances to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to defend. [Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr.
Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950)]. Notice to a person known to be
incompetent who is without the protection of a guardian
does not satisfy this requirement.
The court did not indicate that the knowledge of the
owner's incompetence is essential to the result reached; they
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merely framed their holding in terms of the specific situation. Maryland tax sales provisions are in Md. Code (1951),
Art. 81, Secs. 69-121. The general provisions provide for
notice by mail to the last known address of the last owner
on the tax rolls and for publication. There is no specific
mention of the effect on incompetents. However, an alternative method of foreclosure following a tax sale is provided where the purchaser is Baltimore City (Secs. 115119), and in Sec. 119 it is specifically provided that the
foreclosure shall be binding on all persons including infants
and incompetents. For a recent case emphasizing the
Supreme Court's view on inadequacy of publication alone
to satisfy due process, see Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 77
S. Ct. 200 (1956).
Funeral Expenses - Husband May Recover Wife's
Funeral And Burial Expenses In A Direct Action. Moss v.
Hirzel Canning Co., 100 Oh. Ap. 509, 137 N. E. 2d 440 (Ohio,
1955). Plaintiff, as surviving spouse, sued defendant for loss
of services and consortium and for $1,970.87 for the funeral
and burial expenses of his wife, whose death was allegedly
due to defendant's negligence. Defendant's demurrer was
sustained, and plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed as to the
claim for funeral and burial expenses. Plaintiff does not
have the legal capacity to sue under the wrongful death
statute [Ohio Rev. Code, (Anderson, 1953), Sec. 2125.01
et seq.] which provides for suit only by the personal representative of the deceased, and the injuries which he here
alleges being to himself and not to the deceased are not
covered by the survival statute [Ohio Rev. Code (Anderson, 1953), Sec. 2305.21] which preserves or revives a wrong
to the deceased. The demurrer as to the claim for loss of
services and consortium was therefore well taken. However, plaintiff's right of action for funeral expenses is a
direct action under the common law arising from the husband's duty to provide funeral services and a decent burial
for his wife, similar to his duty to provide necessaries during her life. As to this claim the demurrer was properly
overruled.
Maryland recognizes that a husband is personally liable
for his wife's funeral and burial expenses. The leading
case on the subject, Barnes v. Starr,144 Md. 218, 124 A. 922,
34 A. L. R. 809 (1923), annotated p. 812, held the husband
liable even where he and the wife have been separated for
a number of years. Maryland also recognizes that such
expenses are not recoverable under the wrongful death
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statute, Md. Code (1951), Article 67; State v. Cohen, 166
Md. 682, 172 A. 274, 94 A. L. R. 427 (1934). The cases on
common law recovery of funeral expenses by a near relative from a tort feasor are collected and discussed in 3
A. L. R. 2d 932.
Insurance - Insurer Must Consider Interests Of Insureds In Settlement Of Claims. Radcliffe v. Franklin
National Ins. Co. of New York, 298 P. 2d 1002 (Ore. 1956).
Insureds were involved in an automobile accident, and
defense of the resulting suits was handled by an attorney
employed by the insurer. On the second day of the trial,
the opposing counsel offered to settle for $10,000, the limits
of the liability insurance coverage. The offer was made to
the insurer's attorney, who had no authority to accept it,
and was not communicated to the insured. The suits resulted in judgments totaling $21,500, of which insurer paid
$11,500 with interest and costs. Insureds paid the remaining $10,000 and sued insurer on the ground that failure to
accept the offer and failure to disclose its receipt constituted
bad faith and negligence by the insurer. The trial court
directed a verdict for the insurer. On appeal, held, reversed.
The evidence could warrant findings by the jury that: (1)
the omission to negotiate for settlement was due to the fact
that insurer had no one at the trial with such authority,
and that (2) the financial interests of the insureds were not
considered when the insurer put aside the offer. Under
the policy, the insured commits to the insurer the settlement or defense of claims. Whenever anyone takes custody
of something, tangible or intangible, which belongs to another, he owes that other a duty of care. The minimum
expected of an insurer is that he employ good faith, which
requires consideration of the interests of the insured. While
the company has a right to consider its own interests, it
has no right to sacrifice those of the insured, and its decision in the matter must be honest, in good faith, and with
due consideration for the interests of the insured.
There appear to be no Maryland appellate cases on this
point. Of the more than thirty jurisdictions which have
ruled on the matter, some, e.g., New Hampshire: Dumas v.
HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co., 94 N. H. 484, 56 A. 2d
57 (1947), purport to apply standards of due care, while
others, e.g., Wisconsin: Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins.
Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N. W. 257 (1930), purport to apply
standards of good faith, but the trend, as pointed out in the
Radcliffe case, at 1018, is towards an amalgamation of the
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two. The subject is treated in 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
(1942), Secs. 4712, 4713; Keeton, Liability Insurance and
Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Har. L. Rev. 1136 (1954);
and 9 Md. L. Rev. 349 (1948). The cases are collected in
40 A. L. R. 2d 168.
Motor Vehicles - Automobile Procured By False
Pretenses Is "Stolen" Within The Proscription Of The
Dyer Act. Boone v. United States, 235 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir.,
1956). Defendant purchased an automobile with a check
which he represented to be good but knew to be worthless
and transported the vehicle across state lines. He was convicted under the Dyer Act [18 U. S. C. A. Sec. 2312 (1951)]
which imposes criminal penalties on interstate transportation of a motor vehicle "knowing the same to have been
stolen". He appealed, contending that the word "stolen"
refers only to a vehicle obtained by larceny and not to one
obtained by false pretenses. Held, affirmed. The word
"stolen" is used in the statute in its well known and accepted meaning of unlawfully taking the personal property
of another for one's own use with the intent to deprive the
owner of it permanently.
By this decision the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with
the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits [United States v.
Sicurella, 187 F. 2d 533 (2nd Cir. 1951); Collier v. United
States, 190 F. 2d 473 (6th Cir. 1951); Smith v. United States,
233 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1956)]. The decision overrules District Court decisions in Maryland, United States v. Turley,
141 F. Supp. 527 (D. C. Md. 1956), [probable jurisdiction
noted and transferred to summary calendar, 352 U. S. 816
(1956)], and South Carolina, Ex parte Atkinson, 84 F.
Supp. 300 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1949), and is contra to decisions
in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. [Murphy v. United
States, 206 F. 2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Ackerson v. United
States, 185 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950); Hite v. United States,
168 F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948)].
Negligence - Architect Who Designs A Dangerous Or
Hazardous Structure May Be Liable For Injuries Suffered
By Users Thereof. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 1 A. D. 2d 559, 152 N. Y. Supp. 2d 79 (1956). Infant
plaintiff fell from the back porch or steps of an apartment
leased by his parents and suffered severe injuries. The
infant through a guardian ad litem brought action against
the landlord, the builder, and also the architect who designed the apartment building. The lower court dismissed
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the complaint as to the architect, requiring privity between
the injured party and the architect. The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. There is no
requirement for privity where an action is brought by a
stranger against a manufacturer of an article the use of
which, if the item is defective, probably will cause injury
[MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
1051 (1916)], and there is no good reason for not extending
the doctrine to real property. The imminence of danger
should be the test and not the classification of the object
from which the danger emanates.
Architects are governed by the same rules of law in
this area as contractors, and the general rule as to liability
of a contractor to third persons injured as a result of his
negligent performance is that the contractor is given immunity as to actions by third parties once he has completed the building and it has been accepted by the owner.
The general rule was applied in New York and recognized
in Maryland and most other states, and was based upon the
theory that no privity of contract existed between the contractor and the third person and that no duty was owed by
the contractor except to his contractee. Numerous exceptions to this general rule were created and they occupy
some ninteen pages in 13 A. L. R. 2d 191, 233. Maryland
has recognized an exception and held the contractor liable
to third persons where the work is inherently dangerous
and has created a public nuisance; E. Coast Fr. Lines v.
Cons. Gas. Co., 187 Md. 385, 397, 50 A. 2d 246 (1946). Also,
as acknowledged in Walker v. Vail, 203 Md. 321, 328, 101
A. 2d 201 (1953), Maryland has given qualified recognition
to the MacPherson doctrine. The apparent trend in this
area is indicated by the action of the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia in a recent case, Hannav. Fletcher,
231 F. 2d 469 (C. A. D. C. 1956), overruling an earlier case,
Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F. 2d 253, 52 A. L. R. 619 (C. A. D. C.
1926) [and thereby the companion case of Geare v. Sturgis,
14 F. 2d 256 (C. A. D. C. 1926), involving an architect] on
the ground that they considered it at variance with the
accepted doctrine of the MacPherson case. Compare Tort
Liability to Third PartiesArising From Breach of Contract,
14 Md. L. Rev. 77 (1954).
Property - Joint Tenant Who Kills Co-Tenant By
Reason Of Insanity Takes Property By Survivorship.
Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N. W. 2d 450 (Minn. 1956). H,
afflicted with a serious mental disease, killed W, with whom
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he jointly owned certain real estate. H was indicted for
murder and, following a preliminary hearing, found insane
by the court and committed to an asylum. The administratrix and heirs of W sued H to impose a constructive trust
upon one-half of the jointly owned real estate. The civil
court, upon the facts and exhibits from the criminal proceedings stipulated by counsel, applied the McNaghten test
[embodied in Minn. St. (1949) Sec. 610.10] and found H
legally sane at the time of the killing. The court then presumed that had H not feloniously killed W they would
have died simultaneously and accordingly divided the property among the heirs of each. On appeal, held, reversed.
It is unrealistic in the light of present medical knowledge
of mental diseases to apply the arbitrary right-and-wrong
test in a case such as this. If the killer is insane at the time
of the act, the principle that he may not profit from his
wrong does not apply, and the slayer will not be barred
from taking the property if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease. Two justices dissented on the ground
that the case had been briefed and argued on the McNaghten test and there was not sufficient evidence to warrant
reversal of the lower court's finding on the fact of insanity.
The case is interesting in that the court adopted the
"product" approach in a civil case in a state where by
statute (cited supra) the McNaghten test was applicable
in criminal cases. This case appears to be one of first impression in the United States. For discussions of the tests
as applied in criminal cases, see Sobeloff, From McNaghten
to Durham, and Beyond - A Discussion of Insanity and
the Criminal Law, 15 Md. L. Rev. 93 (1955), and DeVito,
Insanity as a Defense - McNaghten Rule Repudiated by
District of Columbia and Varying Tests for Insanity, 15
Md. L. Rev. 44 and 255 (1955). The latter note points out
that other tests may be used in determining whether people
should be confined to or released from mental institutions.
Torts - Child May Recover For Tortious Prenatal
Injuries Received At Any Time After Conception. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Company, 212 Ga. 504, 93
S. E. 2d 727 (1956). Infant plaintiff alleged that she received
prenatal injuries caused by defendant's negligence which
resulted in physical deformity. The alleged acts of negligence occurred about six weeks after she was conceived.
The trial court entered judgment for the child, but the
Court of Appeals reversed, (93 Ga. App. 391, 91 S. E. 2d
773), holding that a born child cannot maintain such an
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action if it was not quick in its mother's womb at the time
of the injury. On certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court,
held, reversed. A child has a right to recover for tortious
injury sustained at any period of its prenatal life. Two
justices dissented on the grounds that a child is not in
being until it quickens and that to hold otherwise opens the
courts to uncertainty and possibly fraud.
No Maryland holding has gone this far; but the possibility of such recovery was foreshadowed by the threejudge opinion of the Court in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197
Md. 417, 79 A. 2d 550 (1951), noted 12 Md. L. Rev. 223
(1951), which, with two judges (of the then six judge
court) dissenting, permitted a child suffering prenatal
injuries inflicted through the negligence of others to recover
damages. Judge Henderson, in a concurring opinion agreeing with the result, would have restricted the possibility of
recovery to an embryo that "has acquired a human personality and become viable". But, Chief Judge Marbury,
with Judges Delaplaine and Grason concurring, stated for
the Court that if the child is "'able to stir in the mother's
womb' there would seem to be just as logical a basis for
allowing it to recover, as if it were injured after it had
reached the period in its growth when it could be removed
from the mother and live" (438). In dismissing the argument that its decision might result in the Court's being
overwhelmed with faked or fraudulent claims, on which
the dissent in the principal case was based, the court noted
at page 437: "Fraud can be dealt with in this class of cases,
just as in others, and the detection and the elimination of
faked contentions present no novel question to judicial
bodies. Here again, modern medical knowledge will do
away with much of the difficulty." The REvIEw [12 Md. L.
Rev. 223, 227 (1951) ], noting Damasiewicz, stated: "This
would seem to be the first indication by any court that recovery might be had for an injury to a child not yet viable,
or capable of separate existence. But if recovery should be
given to protect an unborn viable child it would seem that
it should be extended to protect a non-viable child also."
This still seems sound. Liability should not be tied to the
technical and difficult medical fact of viability but should
result, as Chief Judge Marbury said, because: "By the
negligence or the willful misconduct of someone an unborn
child has to go through life, crippled, blind, subject to fits,
an imbecile, or otherwise changed from a normal human
being" (438). For other cases, see annotation, Prenatal
Injury as ground of action, 10 A. L. R. 2d 1059.

